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JURY TRIALS IN JAPAN1 
Robert M. Bloom∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the late 1980s, I hosted a group of Japanese lawyers and judges from the Osaka 
Bar Association Committee for Judicial System Reform,2 a group interested in observing 
the jury system in the United States. I took them to the Massachusetts Superior Court3 
where they could observe jury trials. From the discussions I had with the visitors, it was 
clear that they were keenly interested in the concept of citizen participation in the legal 
process. 
 Japan’s commitment to democracy has flourished for 60 years, and is enshrined in 
the preamble of its post-World War II4 Constitution: “Government is a sacred trust of the 
people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are 
exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by 
                                                 
* Professor of Law Boston College Law School 
1 Author wishes to thank Franklin Schwarzer, Arielle Simon and Ben Steffans, students in the class of 2006 
at Boston College Law School. In addition he greatly appreciates the valuable insights provided by Judge 
Naoko Sonobe of the Family and District Court who during 2004-2005 was a visiting scholar at Boston 
College Law School. He also appreciates the thoughtful comments received by  Professor Satoru 
Shinomiya   Waseda University Law School, Tokyo Japan. 
 
2 This group was headed by Professor Takashi Maruta of Kwansei Gakuin University School of Law. 
3 The Trial Court of general jurisdiction in Massachusetts. 
4 Promulgated on November 3, 1946 and went into effect on May 3, 1947. The constitutional monarchy 
with a sovereign emperor was superseded by a constitutional democracy in which sovereignty is entrusted 
in the people. There are three branches the legislative (Diet), executive (the cabinet and prime minister), 
and the Courts. The Diet chooses the prime minister who heads the cabinet.  See, e.g., Scott M. Lenhart, 
Hammering Down Nails, 29 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 491 at 494; 1995 BYU L. REV. 691 at 709 (discussing 
fact that Japanese Cons. was drafted by Americans). 
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the people.”5 Despite this textual commitment, jury trials, a wonderful vehicle for citizen 
participation in governmental operation, have not existed in Japan since 1943.6  
 The French political philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville commented that the jury 
functions as “a political institution…one of the forms of the sovereignty of the people.”7  
The framers of the United States Constitution envisioned jurors not only as a democratic 
check on the government’s efficacy of the court system but also as a way to ensure 
citizen participation in governmental activity.8 
 Inspired largely by the United States Constitution and the American experience 
with jury trials9, Japan has sought to introduce jury trials. The objectives of this reform 
are to ensure greater participation by average citizens within the Japanese judicial system 
and to establish a check on the power of the judiciary. Japan’s desire to adopt jury trials is 
the latest in an international trend toward increasing the participation of citizens in the 
legal process, particularly in criminal trials.10 Being a juror is envisioned as a way to 
                                                 
5 Japanese Constitutional Preamble. 
6 Kent Anderson and Mark Nolan, Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System: A Few Preliminary 
Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System (saiban-in seido) from Domestic Historical and International 
Psychological Perspectives, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 935, 962-63 (2004). 
7 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 291 (Knopf 1945) (1835). 
8 Insight can be found in the language of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (stating: “The 
framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection 
against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an 
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or 
eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but 
perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial 
provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of 
official power--a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or 
to a group of judges.”).  See also United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) (reiterating the importance 
of a right to a jury trial for a convicted defendant). 
9Robert J. Grey,  Justice through Juries, ABA Journal p.8 (January 2005) (stating: “There are more than 
80,000 jury trials in this country every year with nearly a million Americans empanelled to serve. More 
than five times that number take time out of their busy schedules to show up to their local courthouse after 
receiving a summons. Besides voting, few activities in the life of the typical American offer this kind of 
active participation in our system of government.”) 
 
10“Lay participation in the affairs of state is the foundation of a democratic society. Just as the 
participation of laypersons is unquestioned in the legislative and executive branches of 
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involve average Japanese citizens in the operation of government, a sentiment reflected in 
the language of the Justice System Reform Council (JSRC).11 “What commonly underlies 
these reforms is the will that each and every person will break out of the consciousness of 
being a governed object and will become a governing subject…”12 De Tocqueville 
captured the same intent when he commented on the American jury: “Juries invest each 
citizen with a sort of magisterial office; they make all . . . feel that they have duties 
toward society and that they take a share in its government.”13  
 Following the recommendations of the JSRC, the Japanese Diet enacted 
legislation to create jury trials, and in 2009 the Japanese will institute jury trials for 
serious crimes, such as those involving bodily injury.14 The legislation creates a mixed-
jury system where citizens and professional judges determine criminal responsibility and 
sentencing. Specifically, six ordinary citizens (saiban-in) and three professional judges 
                                                                                                                                                 
government in a democratic society, in many countries it has played an important part in the 
administration of justice as well.  In countries making the transition to democracy, legal reformers 
should therefore consider how lay participation could serve to achieve the universal goals of 
criminal procedure in a democratic society, that is, the ascertainment of the truth of the charge so 
as to ensure the conviction of the guilty and the exoneration of the innocent, the respect of the 
human dignity of the accused and the victim in the criminal trial, the protection of society, 
restorative justice, the resolution of conflict and rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders.  In 
doing so, such countries should look to the experiences of other countries as well as to their own 
legal history and tradition in assessing the proper role for lay participation in the administration of 
criminal justice. Although the economic cost of introducing lay participation is a valid 
consideration, legislators should be careful to not use this factor as an excuse for postponing 
otherwise necessary and useful reforms.”  Stephen C. Thaman, Symposium on Prosecuting 
Transnational Crimes: Cross-Cultural Insights for the Former Soviet Union, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L 
L. & COM. 1, 59-65 (2002) (comments at a conference at the International Institute of Higher 
Studies in the Criminal Sciences, “Lay Participation in the Criminal Trial in the XXIst Century” at 
Siracusa, Italy, 5/25-5/29/1999.) 
11 See discussion infra section, History of Reform. 
12 JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council: For a Justice 
System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, (English Version, 2001). 
13 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 7. 
14Reinstating a Jury System, JAPAN TIMES, May 29, 2004 (reporting details of the legislation).  Jury trials 
have been dormant in Japan since 1943. Japan had enacted a Jury law in 1923 and took effect in 1928 there 
was widespread use of jury based decisions by the courts. However, as Lester W. Kiss notes, the jury 
system failed in 1943 because of the fascist political climate, procedural defects in the system which gave 
ultimate authority to the judge, and finally the Japanese respect for authority which held judges in great 
reverence.  Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261 (1999). See also 
Anderson and Nolan, supra note 6 at 962-63. 
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will constitute the jury. Decisions are made by a majority of the group (5-4) provided that 
at least one citizen and one regular judge agree. In cases where the defendant pleads 
guilty, and both parties consent with court approval, a panel consisting of four citizens 
and one professional judge will determine the appropriate sentence. 
 This article will point out that despite the JSRC’s noble motives, a mixed-jury 
system in Japan will not result in greater participation by ordinary citizens in the Japanese 
legal system unless additional procedural safeguards are enacted.  
 This article has five parts. In Part One, I begin by highlighting some differences 
between mixed-juries and the American jury system and then compare the proposed 
Japanese mixed-jury system with European mixed-jury systems . In Part Two, I explain 
why the Japanese opted for a mixed-jury system by examining possible historical and 
political catalysts for the decision. In Part Three, I explore the psychological theory 
surrounding collective judgment and how dominant individuals influence the group 
dynamic. In Part Four, I argue that Japanese cultural attitudes will impede the 
effectiveness of a mixed-jury system in Japan. Finally, in Part Five, I propose specific 
procedural devices to overcome the obstacles inherent in the proposed Japanese mixed-
jury system that will ensure citizen participation, and accomplish the JSRC’s stated 
objectives.  
MIXED-JURY SYSTEM 
   The concept of juries of twelve and unanimous verdicts had its roots in the 
Middle Ages.15 Medieval juries were fact finders in the true sense of the term, as they  
were selected based upon their familiarity with the parties and the facts of the dispute and 
were responsible for finding facts outside the realm of court proceedings.  
                                                 
15 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 US 404, 407 (1972)  
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 The American-jury system grew out of a desire for more efficient, less-costly, and 
less arbitrary administration of justice and is deeply rooted in the history and tradition of 
the United States. 16 In many colonies, the right to a trial-by-jury preceded the practice’s 
incorporation into the Constitution.17 Unlike the medieval juror, they wouldn’t do 
independent fact finding but relied on what was presented in court. The jurors were 
chosen for their impartiality and told to rely on the presentation of facts as presented by 
the lawyers.18 Unanimous verdicts and juries of 12 were largely adopted by the states.19 
In the 1970s, in criminal cases, the requirement for unanimous verdicts and juries of 
twelve were modified by the Supreme Court.20 Notably, in addition to various pragmatic 
considerations, participation on a jury was considered an important exercise of political 
power.21 Thus, the jury system was considered an important means to attaining civil 
liberties and a fundamental pillar of democracy.22 
 A mixed-jury consists of professional judges and ordinary citizens (lay judges) 
who work together to determine culpability and sentencing.  
 Mixed-juries differ from juries in the United States in a number of ways. In a 
mixed-jury system, a legal professional (the judge) provides learned guidance during jury 
                                                 
16 Douglas G. Smith, THE HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS OF JURY REFORM, 25 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 377, 395 (1996). 
17 Id.  at 421-22. 
18 Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U Chi. Legal F. 87. 
19 Apodaca 406 U.S. at 408, n.3. Although in the 17th Century, the Carolinas, Connecticut and Pennsylvania 
allowed for majority votes.  
20 See Id. At 413 (allowing for verdicts of 10-2); See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (allowing for a 
six person jury in criminal trials). Apodaco and Williams were both cases originating in the state court 
system. The Supreme Court was interpreting the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which states 
“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public trials by an impartial 
jury…” This amendment was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. 
Louisians 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Although it should be pointed out that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3(a) requires an unanimous verdict and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure  23(b) requires a 12 person jury 
unless otherwise stipulated.  
21 Id. 
22 Id.at 425. 
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deliberation,23 a potentially beneficial structure given the common lack of comprehension 
by jurors of the judge’s instructions on the law in the United States.24 Another positive 
aspect of a mixed-jury system is the more active role of jurors, who may have an 
opportunity to ask questions during the trial process.25 Additionally, in mixed-jury 
systems, jurors often serve for multiple years and hear numerous cases. In this way, with 
a greater experiential base, they might be able to act with more confidence with a 
professional judge and thereby more readily express their opinions.26 Unlike the United 
States where generally unanimous verdicts are required for conviction of a crime, a 
majority vote usually determines culpability in a mixed-jury system. In addition, because 
of mixed-juries decide issues of fact and law, they avoid the difficult dilemma facing 
juries in the US who are forced to separate questions of law and fact.27 Mixed-juries also 
participate in the sentencing as well as the adjudication of a case.  
 In the United States, the jury verdict is not subject to appeal by the state in 
criminal prosecution because of double jeopardy protection28 and appeals by the 
defendant are limited in most instances to law with the finding of facts by the jury given 
                                                 
23 See, e.g. Markus Dirk Dubber, The German Metaphysical Volk: From Romantic Idealsim to Nazi 
Ideology, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 257 (1995); Thomas Weigend, Symposium: Comparative Criminal 
Justice Issues in the United States,West Germany, England, and France, 42 MD. L. REV. 37, 62 (1983). 
24 See generally Walter W. Steele Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to 
Communicate 67 N.C. L. REV. 77 (1988) (finding jury understanding of court instructions extremely low). 
25 Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals 
for Reform, 48 ALA L. REV. 441, 448-449 (1997). There is a movement in the United States for greater 
involvement of jurors.  See, e.g., 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 35 (reforms in Tennessee allowing for juror note-
taking and questioning of witnesses) see Nicole L. Mott, The Jury in Practice: The Current Debate on Juror 
Questions: “To Ask or Not to Ask, That is the Question,” 78 CHI.,-KENT L. REV. 1099 (2003) (surveying the 
pluses and minuses of jury questioning). This practice has been implemented in Arizona.  See, e.g., ARIZ. R. 
CIV. P. 39(b)(10); ARIZ.R. CRIM. P. 18.6(e); Michael Dann & George Llogan III, Jury Reform: The 
Arizona Experience, 79 Judicature 280 (1996) (discussing the Arizona reforms); Larry Heuer & Steven 
Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 Judicature 
256 (1996) (discussing results of a study designed to observe effects of juror questioning). 
26 Smith, supra note 25, at 462. 
27 The jurisdiction of United States juries is limited to factual determinations. 
28 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states, “nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” 
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great deference. In most mixed-jury systems, there can be a de-novo review of both law 
and fact.  
 While all mixed-jury systems have certain basic traits in common, the countries 
that utilize a mixed-jury system have taken widely varying approaches on jury size, 
voting requirements, whether and how appeals are handled, how jurors are selected, and 
what type of cases the jury can hear.   
 The legislation passed by the Japanese Diet has laid out some of the procedural 
requirements of a mixed-jury system. In cases in which guilt is contested, the jury will be 
a panel of nine: six lay jurors and three judges.29 In cases where there is an 
acknowledgment of guilt and consent by the parties, the panel shall consist of one judge 
and four lay jurors.30 Jurors shall be 20 years or older and able to vote.31 Convictions 
shall be by a majority vote provided that one lay judge and one professional judge agree. 
The jurisdiction of the mixed-jury is restricted to those cases which are punishable by 
death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for at least a year where the crime committed 
by an intentional act caused the death of a victim.32 There is also a provision for an 
immediate appeal.33 The three-judge Court of Appeals (Kososhin) considers both the law 
and the facts of the jury trial. Appeals can be taken by either the defense or prosecution.  
  While Japan’s approach to mixed juries borrows heavily from similar systems in 
Europe, Japan’s proposed mixed jury system is unique.  By briefly examining how mixed 
juries operate in Italy, Germany, Denmark and France, one gets a better idea of how the 
                                                 
29 Law for Criminal Trial in which Saibin-in Participate, , art. 2, no. 2 [hereinafter Criminal Trial].   
30 Id. at art. 2 no. 3. 
31 Id. at art.14. 
32 Criminal Trial, supra note 29, at art. 2, sec. 1 a, b. In 2003 this amounted to a total of 3089 cases. 
http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/saibanin.nsf/ea145664a647510e492564680058cccc/58…. 
33 This is provided by the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure.  Criminal Trial, supra note 29, at art. 82-4. 
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Japanese system will differ from European mixed-juries, and what aspects of the mixed 
jury system the JSRC found especially important.   
Italy 
 The Corte d’assise, Italy’s version of the mixed-jury, is composed of one 
professional judge who serves as “president of the court,” one professional judge from 
the Tribunale (an all professional judge court), and six lay judges.34 To qualify for service 
as a lay juror one must possess Italian citizenship, exhibit good moral conduct, be 
between the ages of thirty and sixty-five, and have completed secondary school 
education.35 The lay jurors preside over the trial with the professional judges and enjoy 
equal judicial authority.36 The jurisdiction of the Corte d’assises, is limited to cases 
involving serious crimes, such as those that result in death or are punishable by a prison 
sentence from twenty-four years to life, and crimes against the state (treason). 37 A simple 
majority is required for deciding guilt or innocence, and sentencing. Tie votes are 
interpreted as an acquittal, yet the most lenient punishment will prevail if no simple 
majority is attained.38 Appeals from the Corte d’assise in Italy are heard by the Corte 
d’assise d’appello, which is also made up of two professional judges and six lay jurors.39 
Because in Italy, broad appellate rights are afforded both parties, issues of law and fact 
can be appealed by the defendant or the prosecution and either side may introduce new 
evidence to the appellate tribunal.40 The Corte di Cassazione is the highest of the 
                                                 
34 Ottavio Campanella, The Italian Legal Profession. 19 J. Legal Prof. 59, 78 (1994).   
35 Stephen Freccero, An Introduction to The New Italian Criminal Procedure, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 345, 351, 
n. 25 (1994) 
36 Campanella, supra at note 34 at 78. 
37 Excluding omicidio colposo (negligent homicide), which is under the jurisdiction of the Pretura. 
Criminal Trial, supra note 29, at arts. 5, 7. 
38 Id. 
39 Campanella, supra at note 34 at 78.  
40 William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of 
Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1992). 
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appellate courts in Italy.41 This court is responsible for reconciling matters of law and is 
not concerned with matters of fact. Each section of the Corte di Cassazione is comprised 
of five professional judges. 
 
 
France 
 The Cour d’assises, the only court in the French criminal system that uses a 
mixed-jury, has jurisdiction over serious crimes, punishable by a prison term in excess of 
ten years.42 The jury is made up of three professional judges and nine lay jurors.43All 
decisions regarding culpability or punishment, unfavorable to the defendant must be 
made by an eight-to-four majority.44 In France, jurors must possess French citizenship 
with full privileges, be between the ages of twenty-three and sixty-one, and be able to 
read and write.45 Due to the perceived influence of the local government, lay jurors 
cannot be civil servants, government ministers, parliamentarians, police or military 
officials.46 
 Jurors are selected at random from the electoral role.47 After being screened by a 
joint committee, a final selection list is drawn up.48 Thirty days before the Cour d’assises 
first sits, a panel of thirty-five jurors is selected, from which nine are selected for any 
                                                 
41 Campanella, supra at note 34 at 79.  
42 Renee Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial For an American Murder 
in the French Cour d’assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV., 791, 800 (2001); Edward A. Tomlinson, Non-
Adversarial Justice: The French Experience, 42 MD. L. REV. 131, 142-3 (1983); 
43 Id. 
44COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (John Hatchard, Barbara Huber, & Richard Vogler, eds., B.I.I.C.L. 
1996) at 74. 
45 Lerner, supra note 42 at 815-16. 
46 COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  supra note 44 at 74. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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particular case by the president in open court.49 There are a total of nine preemptory 
challenges, five challenges for the defense, and four for the prosecution.50  No appeal, 
except concerning issues of law, is possible from the Cour d’assise.51 This is likely 
because the defendant was afforded a jury of his peers and all decisions of the Cour 
d’assise are automatically reviewed by a subdivision of the appellate court without 
request from either the prosecution or defense.52 Issues of law may be appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (Cour de Cassation).53 The appellate jurisdiction of this court is 
limited to: (i) a decision by an irregularly constituted tribunal, (ii) jurisdiction questions, 
(iii) decision in breach of procedural requirements, (iv) a decision not supported by 
written grounds, and (v) a decision not supported by law.54 
Germany 
   
 In Germany, there are two mixed jury systems and the first-instance courts are 
broken into three categories: Local Court, District Court, and Supreme Court.55 The 
mixed-jury section of the Local Court has jurisdiction over misdemeanors punishable by 
up to three years in prison, and consists of a panel containing one professional judge and 
two lay jurors. The District Court has a second type of mixed jury which is comprised of 
three professional judges and two lay judges and has jurisdiction over serious 
misdemeanors, capital offenses, and crimes punishable by over three years in prison.56 
                                                 
49 Id. at 53,74. 
50 Id.  at 74. 
51 Id. at 53. 
52 Id. at 54. 
53 Id. at 55.  
54 Id. at 55-56   
55 Id.  at 102-103 (discussing the jurisdiction and composition of German Mixed Juries). 
56 Id. 
 11
The Supreme Court, consisting of five professional judges, has sole jurisdiction over 
crimes against the state, including murder.57  
 For the mixed-juries in both the Local Court and the District Court, a two-thirds 
majority is required for any decision on guilt or innocence or punishment. The appellate 
system in Germany is slightly more complicated than its continental counterparts. If one 
of the two parties is not satisfied with the judgment, it has two remedies: appeal or 
revision.58 An appeal may be made against a decision of the local court and will address 
issues of fact and law.59 These appeals proceed as a new trial with the appellate court re-
hearing evidence.60 However, this appeal is discretionary and can be denied if the 
appellate court believes the decision of the trial court was correct.61  The District Court 
presides over these “re-trial” appeals62 and such appeals are not afforded against 
decisions of the Supreme Court or of the District Court when it serves as a court of first 
instance.63 
Unlike the appeal procedure, the revision procedure considers only matters of law 
and seeks to provide legal consistency throughout the German Republic.64 All first 
instance decisions are subject to appeal by revision,65 presided over by the Supreme 
Courts and Federal Supreme Court.66 Appeals by revision do not re-consider facts and 
will only occur where if the original judgment was procedurally incorrect or not 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 132-133. 
59 Id.  This is distinct from its American counterpart which only allows for appeals on issues of law. 
60 Id.  These re-trials are subject to similar procedural rules. 
61 Id.  This extends to appeals on matters of fact and matters of law. 
62 Id. at 102-103.  This appellate version of the district court is composed of three professional judges and 
two lay judges and acts as a retrial. 
63 This is likely because of the large size of the presiding bench.  Id. 
64 Id. at 133. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  These are two wholly professional entities. 
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supported by substantive law.67 In this sense the appeals by revision process is very 
similar to the appeals process in the United States. The German system acts to insure 
legal consistency throughout the country by subjecting these decisions to revision by the 
highest courts in Germany.   
 
Denmark 
 
 Denmark adopted its mixed-jury system in 1937 as a means of expanding public 
participation in criminal trials.68 Lay participants are used only in cases where the 
defendant pleads not guilty. 69 Where the potential punishment is more than four years, 
involves a political crime, or involves a question about the defendant being placed in an 
institution, juries of twelve lay participants determine guilt.70 Only economic crimes are 
excluded from the jurisdiction of jury trials as they are thought to be too complicated.71 A 
2/3 vote of 8 to 4 is required for conviction.72After reaching a guilty verdict, the jury then 
deliberates with three professional judges to determine sentencing.73 Each of the 
professional judges has four votes equaling the votes of the twelve jurors.74 In the event 
of a tie, the defendant receives the lesser penalty.75  Appeals in these cases are handled by 
the Supreme Court which can alter the length of the penalty, decide whether the High 
                                                 
67 Id. 
68 Stanley Anderson, Lay Judges and Jurors in Denmark, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 839, 840 (1990) 
69 Eva Smith, The Danish Jury and Mixed Court System, 2002 St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L. J. 29, 31 
(2003) 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 34 
73 See Anderson, supra at note 68 at 839. 
74 Id. at 844.  
75 Id. 
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Court made errors of law, or determine whether there were procedural errors.76 The Court 
does not review the jury’s decision of guilt.77 
 Criminal charges that might result in more than a fine but less than four years of 
prison are initially heard in Municipal Court.78 In these cases, the mixed jury consists of 
two lay judges and one professional judge, who determine guilt and sentencing.79  In 
these cases any question, including guilt, can be appealed.80 Appeals are handled by 
another mixed-jury consisting of three lay participants and three professional judges in 
the High Court.81 While typically a case can only be appealed once, in very special 
circumstances, the decision of the mixed-jury on the High Court can be appealed to the 
Supreme Court. 82 
  
 
HISTORY OF REFORM 
 Academics have highlighted several reasons for Japan’s renewed interest in jury 
trials. In his article, Kiss83 discusses several of these factors, including the aura of 
cynicism that surrounds the judiciary. Anderson and Nolan point out that in addition to 
the desire to deliver better justice and better democracy, some Japanese view a lay 
                                                 
76 See Smith, supra at note 69 at 31. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 37 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 39. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. (If the case is determined to present a problem of principle or special circumstance, it may be 
appealed to the Supreme Court. Permission for this must be granted by a board consisting of three judges , 
a lawyer and a professor from one of the universities). 
83 Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan, supra note 14. 
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assessor system as necessary to ensure international competitiveness in the 21st century 
and as a means of making trials shorter and more efficient.84     
  One reason for the current reforms were a series of highly controversial criminal 
cases in the 1980s.  Between 1983 and 1989, there were four controversial death penalty 
cases involving overturned confessions. The four wrongfully convicted defendants in 
these cases spent a combined 130 years in prison before ultimately being released.85  The 
publicity associated with these cases reflected especially adversely on the judiciary. 
Specifically, the cases highlighted that the Japanese criminal justice system had a 99.9% 
conviction rate, with judges almost always supporting the prosecution. 86 In 1987, as a 
result of the judiciary’s role in these four wrongful convictions and mounting domestic 
pressure for reform, Chief Justice Koichi Yaguchi of the Japanese Supreme Court 
initiated a study examining the feasibility of the jury system in Japan.87 
 Judges in Japan are chosen from a competitive exam after college graduation.88 
The low passage rate on this exam suggests that judges represent a highly intelligent, 
well-educated part of society.89 They are an elitist, homogenous group with limited life 
                                                 
84 Supra note 6 
85 Daniel Foote, From Japan’s Death Row to Freedom, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 11 (1992) (documenting 
cases). 
86 Yumi Wijers-Hasegawa, Jury System Needs to be Made Accessible for Citizens, THE JAPAN TIMES, 
August 5, 2003 (explaining  the high conviction rate might be that prosecution only brings airtight cases-
judge sonobe is the source). See David T. Johnson, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE, 215-218 (2002) 
(finding this prosecutorial practice as well) See also, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) 
(noting, “Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other 
respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the 
determination of guilt or innocence. The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in 
serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the 
States.” It would also suggest another reason for the high conviction rate is that prosecutors tend to 
bring only strong cases.  
87  See Foote, supra at note 71 at 83-84. 
88 One becomes a judge after taking the National Legal Examination (Shilo Shikh) then followed by two 
years of apprentice training.  See Kiss supra note 14. 
89 Pass rate was 2.75% in 2001. Exam taking is a very important part of Japanese society. Japanese describe 
their society as gaku-reki shakai, one which an individual’s future is determined by their academic record. 
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experience.90 Given their youth at the commencement of their judgeship, they tend to be 
more impressionable and are therefore subject to greater influence by some of the veteran 
actors in the system.91 In addition, judges wish to avoid an appellate court overturning 
their decisions, which could hinder their career.92 Moreover, the success of a judge’s 
career in Japan seems linked to his/her readiness to defer to the ruling party and thus find 
in favor of the prosecution.93 Thus there is an incentive to find guilt in order to avoid an 
appeal by a prosecutor.94 
 In addition, because of their societal status, judges are often isolated from 
ordinary people. The jury will expose the judge to ordinary citizens who bring their own 
life experiences to their work as jurors. It is hoped that the introduction of lay jurors into 
the decision-making process will make judges more accessible to the public they serve. 
The American jury was similarly intended to keep “class instincts of the judge in 
check.”95 
                                                                                                                                                 
There are juku (exam cramming schools) because passing examinations is so important. Twelve years of 
pre-college education culminates into two examinations. One taken by all Japanese High School seniors on 
the same day and the other for specific university admission. 
90 Richard Lempert, Jury for Japan? 40 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 37(1992). See also John Haly, Judicial 
Independence in Japan Revisited, 25 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 16-18. (1995). 
91 Judges in the United States are chosen or elected usually after an extensive legal career. Therefore, they 
have  greater life experience. 
92 This is generally believed because of the  bureaucratization of judges so they tend to defer to wishes of 
politicians and government officials. However a conversation with a Japanese Judge, she noted that she 
hopes that by exposing the system to citizens they will see that this assumption is largely a myth. 
93 See, e.g., Hiro Iwamura, Memoir of International Trade Law: Issues of Translating WTO Safeguard 
Provisions into Japanese, 5 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 188, 210 (2004) (continuity of ruling party causes 
judiciary to make decisions in accord with ruling party); M. Christina Luera, No More Waiting for 
Revolution: Japan Should Take Positive Action to Implement the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women 13 PAC. L. J. 611, note 56 (2004) (Japanese Judiciary defers to 
LDP politicians on sensitive issues because those who do enjoy better careers); ); David Johnson, Review 
Symposium on Kagan’s Adversarial Legalism: The  American Way of Law: American Law in Japanese 
Perspective Robert A. Kagan    28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 781 (2003).  
94 THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE, supra at note 86 (suggesting the conviction rate is at least 96.6%).  
95 Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 696 
(1973). 
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 While the wrongful conviction cases and the high rate of convictions might have 
contributed to the exploration of juries in Japan, the major reason for the introduction of 
juries seems to be the idea of greater citizen participation in the running of the 
government. Indeed, as Richard Lempert notes, “The fact that jurors do bring non-legal 
values and understanding to their deliberations is regarded by many as a virtue of the jury 
system and a way of introducing an important democratic voice into the least democratic 
of the three bricks of the modern liberal state government.” 96 
 In July 1999, the Japanese Cabinet formed the Justice Reform Council (JRC), a 
working group of thirteen prominent lawyers, academics and business executives97, and 
asked them to design a Japanese judicial system for the 21st century. One of the project’s 
major objectives was to enhance the legitimacy of the judiciary.  
This Council sincerely hopes that these Recommendations provide the 
opportunity for a new start for the Japanese justice system, that the 
reforms proposed herein will steadily be put into effect, and that the 
justice system at the earliest possible time becomes one that is easy to use 
and meets the expectation and trust of the people.98 
  
 More citizen exposure to the courts is one way to achieve this objective.99 
Throughout its report, the JSRC uses language that clearly indicates that Japan’s 
                                                 
96 Lempert, supra note 90 at 58. 
97 The Council was chaired by Koji Sato, Professor of Law, Kyoto University. This group had over sixty 
meetings, held public hearings, did inspections of various justice-related organizations and conducted 
research visits to the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France. See Setano Miyazawa, Reform 
in Japanese Legal Education: The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan: The Rule of Law at Last? 2 ASIAN-
PACIFIC LT. POLICY 99 (2001) (discussing the make-up of the Council). 
98 JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 12 at “Conclusion,” ch. IV, pt. 1.  This article focuses on the 
introduction of a jury system but it should be pointed out that the Council also suggests other mechanisms 
for public participation including the selection of judges. 
99 Id. at ch. I, pts. 3(1). 
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objective in establishing a jury system is to empower the citizenry.100 In language 
reminiscent of de Tocqueville, the report states:    
What commonly underlies these reforms is the will that each and every 
person will break out of the consciousness of being governed object and 
will become a governing subject, with autonomy and bearing social 
responsibility, and that the people will participate in building a free and 
fair society in mutual cooperation and will work to restore rich creativity 
and vitality to this country.101 
 
With that objective in mind, the JSRC sought to create a mixed-jury (saiban-in) system. 
The reformers suggested a mixed-jury system in which judges and citizens deliberate 
together: 
In order to establish a stronger popular base for the justice system, 
measures shall be taken to expand participation of the people in the justice 
system. As a new system for popular participation in litigation 
proceedings which constitute the core of the justice system, a new system 
shall be introduced for a portion of criminal cases. Under this new system, 
the general public can work in cooperation with judges, sharing 
responsibility for and becoming involved in deciding case autonomously 
and meaningfully.102 
 
 The hope is that citizen participation will result in greater acceptance of the 
justice system and that having citizens work with judges will grant the judiciary wider 
public legitimacy. In addition, if lay judges participate as equals, the results of trials, 
(over ninety-six percent of which currently end in conviction), could become more 
balanced.103  Moreover, greater citizen participation will bring increased legitimacy and 
respect to the judiciary by creating the perception that disputes are resolved openly and 
fairly.104 In addition, De Tocqueville regarded jury duty as a great educational 
                                                 
100 Id. Chapter I “Fundamental Philosophy and Directions for Reform of the Justice System,” 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at ch. I, pt. 3(3). 
103 See Anderson and Nolan, supra note 6 at 943 (suggesting this potential benefit).  
104 In Russia the conviction rate was ninety-nine percent without juries.  Preliminary indications with a jury 
system have reduced this figure to eighty-five percent. “Jury trials raise hopes for accused in Russia, but 
legal ranks skeptical.” FRED WEIR, (Canadian Press, 2003) May 3,  
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opportunity, “a free school” to learn about democracy and the court system in 
particular.105 
 The JSRC’s language regarding the objectives of jury trials and citizen 
participation is wonderfully inspirational. However, by adopting a mixed-jury system, the 
JSRC has greatly limited its ability to achieve these objectives. Inherent in the choice for 
a mixed-jury system is a distrust of the average Japanese citizen to effectively decide 
legal issues. While Japan wants to make its judicial system more understandable to its 
citizens, it is not prepared to entrust decisions solely to them, an approach seemingly 
inconsistent with the democratic ideals that prompted the call for reform in the first place. 
As the later section on Japanese culture will demonstrate, the actual participation of 
citizens in this type of mixed-system will be minimal as opposed to mixed.  
 
HOW COLLECTIVE JUDGMENTS OCCUR 
  Juries are group decision-makers, so not surprisingly the process by which they 
deliberate is similar to other group decision processes.106 A concept that pervades the 
scholarship on group decision-making is that of the “opinion leader”.107 The opinion 
leader exists in the jury as the “dominant juror.”108 The dominant juror often has a 
considerable effect on the deliberation process.109 To mitigate or neutralize the influence 
                                                 
105 De Tocqueville at 275. 
106 See, e.g., Michael L. Berman, Six-Member Juries: Does Size Really Matter? 67 TENN. L. REV. 743 
(2000) Symposium. 
107 Gabriel Weimann, THE INFLUENTIALS: PEOPLE WHO INFLUENCE PEOPLE (State University of New York 
Press, Albany, 1994). 
108 See, e.g., Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and Deviancy, 73 
DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 55-56 (1995). 
109 See, e.g., Emma Cano, Speaking Out: Is Texas Inhibiting the Search for Truth by Prohibiting Juror 
Questionong of Witnesses in Criminal Cases? 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1013, 1035, (2001), citing 1990 Ellyn 
C. Acker, Standardized Procedures for Juror Interrogation of Witnesses, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 557, 559 
(1990) (concluding that uninformed jurors results in persuasion). 
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of the dominant juror on the jury’s decision-making process, studies are starting to 
examine jury characteristics and procedural devices, for selecting, instructing, and 
controlling juries. 
 As part of a group decision-making process, a person often emerges who takes the 
lead. This person dictates the agenda by which the decision is made, and ultimately has 
an inordinate impact on the final decision. This person, the so-called opinion leader,110 
has certain characteristics, such as perceived competence and specific expertise. Certainly 
when it comes to legal proceedings, judges have more experience and familiarity and are 
thus likely to persuade and lead decisions by a jury.111 
 The opinion leader analysis was applied specifically to the jury by Hastie, Penrod, 
and Pennington in their book entitled “Inside the Jury.” In their research, primarily 
conducted through post-trial juror questionnaires, they found an individual juror’s 
perceived persuasiveness was inextricably linked to the juror’s level of education (and 
associated indicia such as income, social status, and occupation).112 Much like the 
“opinion leader” these qualities are undoubtedly embodied by a judge in a manner that 
would allow him or her to emerge as the dominant juror during a trial. 
 The impact that the “opinion leader” has over decision-making is extensive. 113 A 
study conducted by Solomon Asch asked a group of individuals to observe a line that was 
                                                 
110 Weimann, supra note at 107 at 74. 
111 See Anderson and Nolan, supra note 6 at 981 n. 225 (Deference is afforded judges in a mixed jury 
setting. See, e.g., R. Arce et al., Empirical Assessment of the Escabinado Jury System, 2 PSYCHOL., CRIME 
& LAW 175 (1996) (showing post deliberation verdict change toward the judge’s verdict by lay assessors 
observed in mock trial deliberations with one professional judge and five lay assessors). See also Alfonso 
Palmer, Experimental Study of the Effects of Juror Composition, 18 BOLETIN DE PSICOLOOGIA 49 (1988), 
cited in Ana M. Martin et al., Discussion Content and Perception of Deliberation in Western European 
Versus American Juries, 9(3) PSYCHOL., CRIME & LAW 247 (2003) (noting the greater change of initial 
verdicts within mixed juries during deliberations by lay assessors but not by the expert judges))  
112 Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod, Nancy Pennington, INSIDE THE JURY (Harvard University Press, 1983). 
113 Berman supra note 106.(equating group decision making with jury decision making). 
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drawn on a white card.114 They were then asked to select one card from three; specifically 
the one which they thought best represented the line drawn on the original card.115 There 
were eight participants in the study. In the first two selections all eight chose correctly. In 
the third round, some participants were told to select incorrectly in order to observe the 
impact this would have on the unknowing participant. Despite knowing the obvious error 
in the selection, Seventy percent of the subjects went against their senses and followed 
the incorrect majority at least once.116 This effect was enhanced if the subject perceived 
himself to be a member of the group, something that a juror likely would feel about her 
relationship with her peer jurors.117 Asch concluded, “That we have found the tendency 
to conformity in our society so strong that reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young 
people are willing to call white, black, this is a matter of concern.”118 The results of this 
study become even more disturbing as we explore the importance of group identity in 
Japanese culture. It is interesting to note in a Japanese study which measured the effect of 
different ratios of  citizens to judges (2 judges-9 to 11 citizens or 3 judges-six citizens), 
the increasing of judges did not necessarily avoid the judicial dominance.119 
 In her study about group minority opinions, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann identified 
a concept known as the “Spiral of Silence.”120 In her attempt to rationalize a sudden shift 
in German voting behavior days before an election, Noelle-Neumann observed that the 
                                                 
114 Solomon Asch, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Oxford University Press, 1987). 
115 Id. at 13. 
116 Id. at 16 
117 Dominic Abrams, Knowing What to Think by Knowing Who You Are, 29 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 112 
(1990). 
118 Asch supra note 120 at 21. 
119 See Anderson and Nolan, supra note 6 at 976, n. 211 (Y. Ohtsubo et al., How Can Psychology 
Contribute to Designing a Mixed Jury System in Japan?: Ongoing Debates and a Thought Experiment, 
Paper presented at the Fourth Conference of the Asian Association of Social Psychology, Melbourne, 
Austl. (July 2001), available at http://www.nara-u.ac.jp/soc/staffs/ohtsubo/english.htm) 
120 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE (University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
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position with the most vocal support appeared stronger than it really was and other 
positions appeared weaker. Once a position dominated the discourse proponents of the 
other positions were drowned out. She called this process a “spiral of silence.”121 
According to the “spiral of silence” theory, a viewpoint that receives more vocal support 
can dominate and eventually extinguish competing opinions.  Applying the “spiral of 
silence” to jury deliberations, the dominant juror is likely to be the most vocal or at least 
the most influential participant in the deliberations and may therefore actually silence 
other jurors.122 
 In 1970, the Supreme Court of the United States approved the constitutionality of 
a six-person criminal jury,123 and later approved the constitutionality of a six-person civil 
jury;124 prior to these decisions a twelve-person jury was constitutionally required.125 
Immediately following the Court’s rulings, scholars began to study the effect that jury 
size has on the dominance of a single juror. Research suggests that because people’s 
timidity and insecurity are greater in larger numbers thus rendering them less likely to 
speak,126 a larger jury enhances the likelihood of domination by an individual juror.  
 A second area of research is the extent to which jurors are allowed to participate 
in the court proceedings.  In an effort to enhance the understanding of jurors, especially 
in light of complex litigation, some courts have endorsed witness-questioning by 
                                                 
121 Id. at 5. 
122 Fred L. Strodtbeck & Richard D. Mann, Sex Role Differentiation in Jury Deliberations. 19 SOCIOMETRY 
3 (1956). 
123 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
124 Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). 
125 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898). 
126 See e.g. Boster, Franklin. An Information Processing Model of Jury Decision Making. 18 Comm. Res. 
524   note 108. 
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jurors.127 In DeBenedetto,128 the Fourth Circuit allowed juror-questioning in extreme 
circumstances yet warned of the power this gives to the dominant juror: “…one or two 
jurors often will be stronger than the other jurors, and will dominate the jury inquiries.”129 
The court feared that the dominant juror who audibly relayed their questions would be 
able to influence fellow jurors and thus persuade and impose premature deliberation.130 
The court’s fears were realized in DeBenedetto, when the dominant foreperson asked 
over half of the ninety-five questions asked during trial.131  
 One way to allay such fears of juror dominance associated with audible witness 
questioning is to permit only written questions, reviewed and asked by the judge. Such an 
approach was endorsed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 1999.132 
 A third area of focus that researches have looked at is juror note-taking with some 
concern that note-taking skills correlate to an individual’s level of education thus creating 
a further opportunity for juror dominance.133 However, a recent study showed that the 
connection between note-taking and deliberation dominating was not steadfast.134 
 Despite the seemingly unavoidable reality of the existence of the dominant juror, 
accurate decisions are still likely to be reached. One study showed that regardless of the 
make-up of the jury, a twelve-person panel was able to reach the correct decision eighty-
three percent of the time, compared to a sixty-nine percent accuracy for six-person 
                                                 
127 See, e.g., Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through Note Taking 
and Question Asking, 79 Judicature 256, (1996) (survey finding juror understanding increased with their 
level of participation). 
128 DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512 (1985). 
129 Id. at 516. 
130 Id. 516-517. 
131 Id. at 517. 
132 United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719 (1999). 
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panels. Similarly, a recent study showed that, groups, regardless of their make-up, were 
more accurate decision makers than individuals at least concerning complex matters.135 
Moreover, studies overwhelmingly show that larger groups are more likely to render 
accurate decisions.136 
JAPANESE CULTURE 
 The importance of social status within Japanese culture was driven home for me 
during a six-week teaching experience in Japan.137 The janitor of my office building 
would greet me each day with a low bow. One day, as a symbol of my respect for him, I 
tried to bow lower than him during our morning encounter. I saw that this made the 
janitor rather uncomfortable (which certainly was not my objective!). I saw similar 
examples of this consciousness of social status during dinners following my talks before 
various Japanese bar associations when I, as the honored guest, was seated next to the 
person of highest status (the President of the bar association). 
 Japan’s unique cultural attributes present a large challenge to establishing 
meaningful citizen participation in the Japanese judicial system.  Even in its report, the 
JSRC recognizes inherent impediments in Japanese society that inhibit meaningful citizen 
participation. The people are accustomed to being governed, and view the “government 
as the ruler (the authority).”138 The Council’s recommendations seek to transform the 
people from passive to active participants in the operation of the government.139   
                                                 
135 Michael J. Saks, SMALL-GROUP DECISION MAKING AND COMPLEX INFORMATION TASKS (Federal 
Judicial Center, 1981). See infra note 181. 
136 Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probabilitiy—Ironies in the Evolution of Social Choice Theory, 76 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 975, 1037, fn 3. 
137 I taught Principles of American Law at Kwansei Gakuin University School of Law in Nishinomiya. 
138 JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 12 at ch. I pt. 1. 
139 A further indication of citizen passivity can be found in a statement by JSRC chairman Professor 
Emeritus Kofi Sato: “I think we have reached the situation where we have to re-think how human beings 
should live, that is as “autonomous individuals”. I feel that the time has come to outgrow this society which 
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  Japanese culture puts a high value on group relationships. The slang expression 
“going along to get along” is particularly applicable to Japanese culture. A distinction 
exists in Japanese society between what one says (tatemae) and what one really thinks 
(honne). Not expressing oneself honestly has a great deal to do with fitting in to the 
group.  The emphasis on fitting-in is highlighted in elementary-school text books in Japan 
that state that good relationships with others are valued more than asserting one’s own 
ideas.140 The concept of harmony is a cornerstone of Japanese culture, a concept found in 
the first clause of an early Japanese constitution dating back to 697 A.D.  “Harmony is to 
be valued, and an avoidance of wanton opposition to be honored.” There is a Japanese 
proverb that captures the importance of harmony: “The nail that sticks up gets pounded 
down.”141  
 What flows from this desire to get along is a great emphasis on group 
identification. Much of a Japanese individual’s self-esteem comes with his/her group 
identification. Thus, group disapproval can be devastating. Some even suggest that group 
disapproval provides a powerful deterrent for crime in Japan.142  
 In addition to fitting in there is also great respect, and resulting deference to one’s 
social status as reflected in wealth, profession, and position. The Japanese have a high 
level of respect for authority figures, a definite legacy of the Confucianism influence. 
There are three relationships prominent in Confucian ethic – father-son, ruler-subjects, 
and husband-wife. Each of these relationships emphasizes deference to the superior 
                                                                                                                                                 
passively depends on regulation from above, and to rebuild and form a self-reliant base.  The departure 
point is self-reliance based on the autonomous individual, so we have to prepare a social structure that 
facilitates this”. Cited  in Anderson and Nolan, supra note 6 at 944. 
140 Japanese Studies on Attitudes Towards Person with Mental Retardation, 40 MENTAL RETARDATION 
245-251 (June 2002). 
141 Robert C. Christopher, THE JAPANESE MIND 53 (Linden Press: Simon & Schuster 1983). 
142 Id. at 163. 
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figure.143 In a family, usually the opinion of the household head is the rule. Any 
dissenting opinions are regarded as disloyal.144  
 Similar status issues also appear in the language.  In English, the word “you” is 
used to describe anyone regardless of status. In Japanese, age, gender, and status affect 
the form of address. Given the emphasis that in effective group decision-making, 
everyone must be of equal status, it is somewhat problematic when the language itself 
calls attention to various status concerns.145 
The Japanese people prefer trial by “those above the 
people” rather than by “their fellows,” and that this caused 
the Japanese to distrust juries from the beginning. People 
trust judges because they have a special sense of 
responsibility when adjudicating cases and try to keep their 
moral standards high in order to ensure impartial trials. 
Therefore, citizen participation in the judicial process is 
ultimately not suitable for the Japanese people because 
citizens would simply prefer to have a judge decide their 
case rather than their fellow citizens. Scholars disagree on 
exactly how much weight should be given to the cultural 
aspect of the failure of the earlier jury system in Japan, but 
most agree culture played some part.146 
 
 
  
Anderson and Nolan would question the assumption that Japanese citizens would 
automatically defer to the judge’s opinion. They point out that the JSRC, aware of this 
cultural perception thought that with the appropriate leadership and education this 
cultural deference would change over time.147 Hierarchy, harmony, and group identity, 
are three powerful reasons why a mixed-jury system will tend to stifle free and open jury 
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144 See Chia Nakone, Japanese Society (1950), reprinted in JAPANESE CULTURE AND BEHAVIOR: SELECTED 
READINGS 155 (Takia Sigyang Lebra & William P. Lebra eds., 1978). Lempert, supra note 90 at 40. 
 
145 Id. 
146 Kiss, supra note 14 at footnotes 269-70. 
147 Anderson and Nolan, supra note 6 at 987.  
 26
deliberation, and leads to several questions. First, will the superior figure of the judge 
become the dominant juror and have an undue influence on the jury panel?  In any 
society, judges are respected and have a great deal of influence. In the United States, 
“jurors typically begin their jury experience by viewing the judge with great deference. 
Jurors are laypersons, and look  up to the judge, who is an authority figure, robed in 
black, seated on high with gavel in hand; clearly the judge is experienced and in control 
of the proceedings”. 148 When we couple this with the hierarchal nature of Japanese 
culture, we are presented with a difficult problem especially when we consider the group-
decision making data.  Secondly, with the ideal of harmony engrained in the Japanese 
psyche will dissenting opinions be put forward?  Finally, given the emphasis placed on 
group approval, how many jurors will take a position and risk the wrath of the group?149 
 As has been previously mentioned, a majority vote is all that the legislation 
required for conviction.150 Although some studies have indicated that a majority vote or 
unanimous verdicts can be similar151, the concern of the dominance of judges within the 
deliberation process might be alleviated if a unanimous vote were instituted. At a 
minimum, it would improve the perception of meaningful citizen deliberation.  At a 
maximum, it might enhance the quality of argument during the deliberation process as 
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Judges Verbal and non Verbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials 38 Stan. L. Rev. 89 (1985) discussing the 
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one holdout would have to be convinced to change positions.152 Certainly a unanimous 
vote or a minimum 2/3 vote would foster greater deliberation because it would be 
necessary to convince jurors not agreeing with the majority position. 
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Notwithstanding the basic structure of the mixed-jury system, there are a number 
of implementary and procedural measures that can ensure “meaningful and autonomous 
participation.” Although, as previously expressed, there are some inherent problems with 
mixed-juries, the following recommendations are made in light of the confines of the 
system adopted by the Japanese Diet. 
    PRINCIPAL OF ORALITY 
 The trend in Japan has been toward greater orality, and non-oral evidence is only 
admissible with the consent of the parties. The term orality refers to evidence presented 
to the factfinder through the testimony of live witnesses. Even with a guilty plea consent 
is required for the introduction of a written statements. Orality during contested trials 
should go a long way to putting the prosecution and defense on equal footing so that 
prosecutors unable to rely on written documents will need to work harder by presenting 
witnesses at trial in order to prove their cases.  
 Another reason for the high conviction rate is the use of confessions. Confessions 
are allowed in a vast majority of cases and often form the basis for the conviction.  Since 
suspects may be detained for up to 23 days before charging, it is not surprising that 
                                                 
152 See Id. at 981, n. 223 ( C.J. Nemeth, Dissent, Diversity and Juries in Social Influence in Social Reality: 
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confessions are obtained.153  Because of their importance in the system, there is a great 
deal of pressure on prosecutors to secure confessions. This pressure, coupled with the 23-
day detention could lead to abusive tactics in obtaining confessions.154 Greater orality in 
the system, will help expose the possible abuses in obtaining confessions.  
 Orality also allows the system to take advantage of the collective wisdom and 
common sense of the jury; the jury must evaluate live witnesses to access their verbal and 
non-verbal attributes. “To ensure that saibin-in who are laypersons, can sufficiently form 
decisions by examining the evidence presented at trial, it is necessary to materialize the 
principles of orality and directness.”155 Another concern for jury comprehension is that 
trials presently within the jury trial jurisdiction once commenced are often interrupted 
and continued for various periods (weekly or a month).   To maximize the benefits of 
orality and ensure that jurors memories remain intake, once a trial begins it should be 
completed without interruption. 
 The only exception to the principle of orality should occur when the witness is 
unavailable (out of the jurisdiction or ill) and there exists some indicia of truthfulness of 
the out-of-court (on a par with the rules of hearsay developed in American 
jurisprudence). A deposition with all parties represented might provide sufficient 
truthfulness to allow for such an exception. A section of the legislation would seem to 
minimize the importance of orality as it allows for examinations of witnesses outside of 
the courthouse. It does, however, allow for the presence of jurors who may then 
                                                 
153 Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure –Article 203, 205, 208. 
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participate in the examination.156 This provision is limited to witnesses who because of 
health, age, occupation or other limitations, cannot testify in court.157 
ACTIVE ROLE FOR JURORS 
 A movement in the United States has begun to reform the jury system so as to 
encourage jurors to take a more active role during the trial.158  The assumption that jurors 
who passively sit throughout a trial will retain and understand the evidence is hardly 
consistant with educational pedagogy. It is thought that greater juror comprehension will 
occur if steps are taken to involve jurors before the Judge’s instructions at the end of the 
trial, so methods have been developed to involve jurors more in the trial process.159 
 This greater involvement of jurors will result in a more knowledgable jury. More 
knowledge in a mixed system is crucial to leveling the playing field between the judges 
and jurors. To this end  the Japanese legislation allows for jurors to participate in the 
questioning of all the witnesses including the defendant.160Although there were no 
provisions for note-taking in the legislation, one would assume that it is allowable. It 
appears that deliberation is to occur at the end of the trial.161 I would suggest that they 
implement a pre-deliberation mechanism.  Most jurisdictions in the United States frown 
                                                 
156 Id. art 57. 
157  Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that a court may examine a witness out of the 
courthouse, when it (a) counsels a public prosecutor and a defendant or his/her attorney, (b) considers the 
importance of the witness, his/her age, occupation, health condition, other matters and the gravity of a case, 
and (c) deems such a examination is necessary.  C.C.P. art 158.  
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proceedings. 
159 Robert G. Boatright, The 21st Century: Reflections from the Cantigny Conference, 83 Judicature 288, 
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on such deliberations, as they are concerned that jurors will make up their minds before 
they have heard all the evidence. However, with a judge present, such pre-deliberation 
discussions could avoid such a predetermination as the judge will carefully monitor the 
discussions. These preliminary discussions help jurors retain and process the pieces of 
information they are hearing. This predeliberation would be especially useful during a 
long trial. In addition I would recommend pre-trial instructions as to the law and 
explanations as to the various trial procedures and type of rulings be given to the jurors. 
At the start of the trial these instructions should include the various elements of the crime 
before the jury as well as the procedural steps to be followed during the trial. This 
approach will not only address the power imbalance but will aid the saiban in 
understanding the importance and relevance of the evidence and will help them 
remember the evidence during the final deliberation process.162 
      
DELIBERATIONS 
 Since jury deliberations in the United States are conducted in great secrecy, little 
is known about how jurors actually deliberate. Each jury is free to structure the 
deliberations as it sees fit with the only requirement being the selection of a foreperson. 
Jurors in the United States report that they would often go into deliberations without 
being given guidance as to how to deliberate.163  Because of my previously expressed 
concerns about the Japanese mixed-jury system, I would suggest a carefully structured 
deliberation process.  
                                                 
162 Juries for the Year 2000 and Beyond, PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM IN 
WASHINGTON D.C. see recommendation 27 at p.61-
http://www.courtexcellence.org/juryreform/juries2000_final_report. See also Jurors:The Power of 12, The 
Arizona Supreme Court Committee on the More Effective Use of Juries  (1994). 
163 Id. Juries for the year 2000- Recommendation 29 at p.65. 
 31
Foreperson 
 The conduct of the judge(s) on the mixed jury during the deliberation is crucial. 
Judges should be trained so as to allow for meaningful and autonomous participation of 
lay jurors. Although the legislation does not reflect this safeguards, there is at least 
recognition of concerns centering on the active participation of lay jurors during the 
deliberation process.  One requirement notes that jurors must be given an opportunity to 
state their opinion and that the judges are required to see that the opportunity arises. 164 
To this end, I suggest that a layperson be chosen as a foreperson (leader of the jury). I 
would have the presiding judge select this person based upon the judge’s assessment of 
the person’s leadership and character.  This foreperson should be given a simple 
instruction manual and/or video to describe his/her responsibilities. By having a 
layperson as chair of the jury deliberation, I would hope to diminish the role of the judge. 
An additional safeguard would require the foreperson to meet with each juror privately 
and solicit his/her position. In this way, each juror would not be influenced by the 
conformity principles found in the society. Judges should also withhold their opinions 
until each juror has expressed his/her opinion.  It is worthy to note that many japanese 
judges, sitting in panels of three, are accustomed to having the younger judges express 
their opinion first so as to eliminate the hesitation that less experienced judges  may have 
in expressing their opinion.  
   Before expressing their opinion, judges should act more as evidentiary 
advisors to the lay jurors. During deliberation, judges should help ensure that the 
evidence is given its appropriate weight. For example, evidence which is highly 
prejudicial because of its emotional appeal, the judge should suggest that it not be given 
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undue weight. Because evidentiary rules can be complex and difficult for lay persons to 
understand, an advantage that a mixed-jury system has is that the elaborate evidence rules 
found in the United States are not necessary. The evidentiary rules exist largely because 
of an inherent distrust that the jurors will misuse information. 
 To insure meaningful citizen participation and to guard against the judge’s control 
of the deliberation, the jury decision should be a detailed record of the process. The JSRC 
recognized the need to have a transcript of jury deliberation to ensure the trust of the 
public, litigants, and to retain an appeal-able record.165 Stephen C. Thurman recommends 
the French system in which the presiding judge summarizes the argument of the defense 
and prosecution and then has a series of questions regarding the facts. The jury’s 
response to these questions will then be utilized in applying the law, and the answer will 
also be included in the record.166 This approach is similar to the special-verdict approach 
utilized in the United States Law, in which jurors decide fact issues on a case-by-case 
basis without considering issues of law.167 Their responses to these questions are 
recorded and the trial proceeds under the aegis of their answer. Moreover, as Professor 
Mark Brodin points out, the special verdict is an adequate procedural remedy to the 
problem of jurors’ confusion with legal concepts inherent when they are called upon to 
determine mixed law and fact questions.168 In additon, a jury instruction explicitly stating 
that the jurors are indeed independent and are free to disagree with the judge is 
imperative. 
                                                 
165 JUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 12 at ch. IV, pt. 1(4)(b). 
166 See Japan’s New System of Mixed Courts: Some Suggestions Regarding Their Future Form and 
Procedures, 2001 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANS’L L.J. 89 at 109 (2001) (thoughtfully presenting how best to 
ensure actual lay participation). 
167Mark S. Brodin,  Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process–The Case for the 
Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15. 
168 Id. at 22. 
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Educate the Public 
 Since service by the initial group of jurors will be a totally new experience,  it is 
imperative that the notice to jurors empathetically consider and address many of the 
jurors’ concerns. Brochures or videos should be sent describing the importance of this 
civic service as well as how it will operate. Carefull marketing should be employed so as 
to alleviate anxiety as well as provide positive encouragement and incentive to show up. 
Such mundane issues as how to get to the court, the time of lunch break, the appropriate 
dress, should all be addressed.169 
 To ensure that citizens become more aware of their role as jurors, a massive 
public education program should be initiated. This program should include a broad 
assortment of tools including: tours of the courthouse, educational television about the 
role of the jurors presented by judges and attorneys, an introductory video or lecture by 
the judge to jurors on their day of service and publication of easy to read pamphlets and 
other reading material. In addition, the idea of jury service should be introduced to school 
children at an early age. To this end  teachers should be trained and curriculum adjusted. 
Hopefully, such a program will help to alleviate the cultural concerns mentioned 
earlier.170 
    SELECTION PROCESS 
Jury Pool 
                                                 
169 Supra note 162 recommendation 3-5 at p.5-7 
170 The state of Arizona has done a great deal of thinking about effective ways to use juries. See Official 
State Website at www.supreme.state.az.us/jury.htm. 
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 With regard to the selection process of jurors, Japan should not make the same 
mistake historically made in the United States of readily granting many exemptions to 
perspective jurors. Often people with higher-ranking societal positions ask for, and 
receive, exemptions from jury service. A movement to eliminate exemptions took place 
in the early 1980’s as jury service became less burdensome. Each juror was guaranteed 
that his/her service would be limited to one day or, if chosen, to one trial. The one 
day/one trial system is now prevalent throughout the United States. Once a juror fulfills 
this requirement, he/she will be exempt from further service for at least three years. In 
proposing this approach, I recognize that many countries utilize mixed-jury jurors who 
serve for a period of several years.171 Although I see the benefit of this experience to 
ensure a more confident and forceful juror, I am concerned that the extent of the 
commitment might eliminate certain well-educated members of the Japanese society with 
important positions (e.g. doctors, teachers). I would advocate for less-experienced,  
more-intelligent jurors than more-experienced, less-intelligent jurors. 
 With exemptions utilized, it is not uncommon to have a jury panel made up of 
elderly or underemployed people. The reduction and elimination of exemptions has 
resulted in a more meaningful cross-section of jurors. In this way, more people with 
responsible, societal positions will be part of the jury. From the data on collective 
decision making previously discussed, it appears that better-educated individuals would 
have more confidence to express their position in deliberation with a judge, who is 
perceived as an individual with an elevated societal status. 
                                                 
171 John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative fill the American 
Need? 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195, 206 (1981).  In Germany, jurors are selected to serve four year 
terms. 
 35
 People who are 20 years or older and eligible to vote and have completed 9 years 
of compulsory education or can demonstrate equivalent learning are eligible for jury 
service.172 Similar to the American trend of one trial or one day, the legislation allows a 
juror to refuse service if they have previously served within five years.173 There are 
numerous exemptions including governement officials and anyone associated with the 
court and a catch-all discretionary exemption “…their business will suffer damage if they 
do not handle the important matter relating to the business.”174 I have concerns that this 
type of general exemptions might result in jurors with lesser  social status to selected 
participate equally with the judges. 
 The system adopted by the Diet also has a provision for preemptory challenges to 
jurors.175 This provision is rather troubling in light of the prosecutor’s considerable 
success in the high rate of conviction.  He/she might be inclined to exercise his/her 
preemptory challenges on jurors who are well educated and more likely to express 
themselves in the deliberation.176 
Impartiality 
 The goal of any jury system is to have impartial jurors. But what is meant by 
“impartial” is a crucial consideration. By “impartial” I do not mean absolute ignorance of 
the case. Mark Twain, a famous American author, commented in 1871 as follows: “a 
noted desperado (criminal) killed Mr. B, a good citizen, in the most wanton and cold-
blooded way . . . the papers were full of it, and all men capable of reading read about it.” 
                                                 
172 Criminal Trial, supra note 29, at art.art 13 and art. 14(1)(i).  Requirement for completing compulsory 
education (9 years) unless there is a demonstration they have the requisite intelligence. 
173 Id. at art. 16 1)d) 
174 Id. at art. 16 1)g) 
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176 See Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 5 NW. U. L. 
REV. 190, 194 (1990). See also Bateson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 
U.S. 42 (1992); JEB v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) 
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The odd lot of “fools and rascals,” who neither read nor talked about the case, was sworn 
in as the jury. Twain commented, “The system rigidly excludes honest men and men of 
brains.”177 When a case is highly publicized, jury selection works to lower the 
educational level of jurors. For example, people who read a daily newspaper or watch or 
listen to the news will be eliminated because they follow the events too closely. In order 
to ensure that a jury is composed of informed citizens, I would define the impartial 
standard more flexibly. As opposed to focusing on knowledge about a particular case, I 
would focus instead on juror open-mindedness and willingness to consider only the 
evidence presented at the trial. In this way, the jury won’t exclude “men of brains.” 
Impartiality is mentioned in the legislation but it remains to be seen how it will be 
interpreted.178 
   
CONCLUSION 
 Even though I have substantial concerns regarding the configuration of the juries 
in Japan, I have no doubt that group solutions are usually better than individual solutions 
and larger group solutions are ordinarily better than smaller group solutions.179 Groups 
will tend to remember more than an individual, and individual prejudice can be 
neutralized in a group setting. The Supreme Court of the United States considered the 
issue of a five-person jury in Ballew v Georgia.180 After reviewing the research data181 
                                                 
177 Mark Twain, ROUGHING IT 256 (Signet Classic, New American Library, 1872). 
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the court concluded that numerosity insured more effective group deliberation.182 Saks 
also found the greater the size of the jury the more likely it would be accurate.183 The 
studies cited do not reflect the status differences among the jurors as would exist in the 
mixed-jury system in Japan.184 
 The hope is that this is a first step in the implementation of the Japanese jury. 
Subsequent steps with the JSRC primary intent of creating a “popular base” in mind 
might move from mixed juries to the American model of exclusively citizen juries. Also 
it is hoped that as juries become more inculcated into japanese society expansion of jury 
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decision making will take place. The JSRC indicated that flexible as they discussed the 
creation of an appropriate environment for the introduction of a new jury system as well 
as a constant monitoring and modification of the system to insure a “popular base.”185 
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